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II1. Introduction
More than ten years after Re-Unication the situation on the labour markets in West and East Germany
still diers enormously. This becomes obvious when looking at the unemployment rate in 2001 which
was 7.4% in West Germany and 17.5% in the East. To overcome this unemployment problem, active
labour market policies (ALMP) are regarded as a suitable measure. Therefore it is not surprising that the
Federal Employment Oce (FEO) spends signicant resources on these measures. The most important
ones are vocational training (VT) and job creation schemes (JCS).
Since 1998 the new legal basis for ALMP is the Social Code (SGB III) which has replaced the Work
Support Act from 1969. Changes have been made not only in the objectives, like a more intensive focus
on problem groups of the labour market, but also in the institutional organisation of labour market
policy, leading to decentralisation and more 
exibility in the regional allocation of resources to dierent
measures. The local employment oces are now allowed to allocate their budgets relatively freely to
dierent measures to adjust the policies to the situation on the local labour markets. Typically, in
situations with great imbalances in the labour market JCS are preferred to training measures, whereas in
areas with low unemployment rates hardly any JCS are started. Consequently, JCS play a much bigger
role in the East than in the West. Whereas in East Germany the number of entries into vocational
training is four times higher than the number of entries in job creation schemes, this ratio is nearly equal
in the East.
Up to now, evaluation of job creation schemes has been constricted due to an unsatisfactory data situation.
Only a few studies evaluating the microeconomic eects of JCS exist and they all focus on the labour
market in East Germany.1 Due to this and the small sample sizes in the analyses, the use of the results for
general policy implications is problematic. But with the introduction of the SGB III a mandatory output
evaluation of active labour market policies has been introduced. Simultaneously, the data situation has
improved crucially.
Our paper presents a microeconometric evaluation of job creation schemes in Germany, focussing on
the eects on the participating individuals and taking account for several sources of heterogeneity. The
estimation is based on a dataset merged from dierent administrative sources of the FEO. It contains
information on all participants in job creation schemes who started their programme in February 2000,
that is 11,376 individuals. The control group consists of 232,399 individuals who met the institutional
conditions for participation in job creation schemes in January 2000. The pool of available variables can
be dierentiated into four categories: Socio-demographic, qualication and career information as well as
regional context-variables to take account for the situation on the local labour market.
Microeconometric evaluation is generally plagued by the fundamental evaluation problem. That is, one
has to make inference about the outcome that would have been observed for participants had they not
participated. To overcome this counterfactual situation, identifying assumptions have to be invoked which
are generally untestable. The most common assumption in this context is the conditional independence
assumption (see e.g. Rubin (1977)), which requires that treatment participation and treatment outcomes
are independent conditional on a set of observable characteristics X. Since conditioning on all relevant
covariates is limited in case of a high dimensional vector X (`curse of dimensionality'), the use of so-called
balancing scores is proposed. The exhaustive and informative dataset at hand does justify the application
of a matching estimator which exploits CIA but avoids almost any other assumption (Lechner (2002b)).
1For an overview of these studies see Hujer and Caliendo (2001).
1The basic idea underlying it is to replace the counterfactual outcome of the participants by the outcome
of a selected group of `comparable' non-participants. Besides being an intuitively appealing approach
and therefore easy to communicate to policy makers, the matching approach avoids functional form
assumptions and allows the eects to be dierent in specic sub-populations (individual heterogeneity).
Furthermore in its multiple-treatment version (see Lechner (2001) and Imbens (2000)) it allows to take
account for the fact that the evaluated programmes are not homogeneous (programme heterogeneity).
Since the sub-parts of the analysed JCS are very diverse regarding their type of occupation (e.g. `Con-
struction & Industry' vs. `Oce & Services'), intensity, duration, etc. and additionally we expect the
eects to be dierent for dierent strata of the population, e.g. long-term unemployed or young unem-
ployed and nally also regional and gender-specic dierences are important, this seems to be a suitable
approach.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: At rst we will give an overview of the institutional
setup and instruments of ALMP in Germany. Following that we will describe the dataset and compare
the participants in the dierent sectors of JCS with the non-participants. In section 4 we will outline
the general framework for the microeconometric evaluation and present the matching estimator used in
this study. In the empirical analysis in the subsequent section we describe the implementation of the
estimator, present results and draw some policy implications. Finally, we conclude and give an outlook
for further research.
2. Institutional Setup and Instruments
The main purpose of this paper is to answer the question if job creation schemes enhance the labour
market prospects of the participating individuals. To understand the eects of the dierent types of
programmes and the composition of the participating individuals, we will rst review the labour market
situation as wells as the institutional environment of these programmes.
2.1. One Country { Two Labour Markets
A persistent unemployment rate in connection with high expenses for labour market policies characterises
the German labour market of the last two decades. However, talking of `the' German labour market
might be misleading due to the special situation of the re-unied Germany after 1990. As a legacy of
the former countries, the regional labour markets in western and eastern Germany dier substantially.
From 1990 until 1993 the eastern labour market was characterised by an enormous employment reduction
from about 9.75 million jobs down to 6.25 million. Besides the structural crisis due to the collapse of
the Command Economy, problems arose through diculties in the adoption of the new economical and
behavioural situation. As a consequence, the stock of unemployed increased. However, because of a
massive deployment of active labour market and social policy measures, a strong migration, and a high
number of commuters to the western part, there were only about 1.15 million workers openly unemployed
on yearly average. In the years between 1993 and 1995, after this 'Re-Unication-Shock', the eastern
labour market was stabilised and recovered slightly. This was mainly driven by a higher demand in the
construction business. Since 1996, however, the situation is declining again. While the number of jobs has
decreased in the following years, the stock of unemployed has risen up to 1.37 million. Although these
gures represent the persistent problems of the eastern labour market, there were also some positive
2developments, like a good progress in the renovation of the economy. The transformation is processing
still, and a quick convergence is not expected.
Table 1: The two labour markets in Germany
West East
Year 2000 2001 2000 2001
Employment (in million people)1 32.120 32.486 6.406 6.287
Unemployment (in million people)1 2.529 2.478 1.359 1.374
Unemployment Rate 7.8% 7.4% 17.4% 17.5%
Entries into Vocational Training 337,880 261,199 213,654 188,423
Entries into Job Creation Schemes 78,684 61,890 181,395 130,147
Spending on
Passive Labour Market Policies (in bn Euro) 24.09 24.91 13.71 13.86
Active Labour Market Policies (in bn Euro) 12.23 12.42 9.77 9.89
Vocational Training (in bn Euro) 4.06 4.19 2.75 2.80
Job Creation Schemes (in bn Euro) 1.02 0.86 2.66 2.11
1 on yearly average
Source: Bundesanstalt f ur Arbeit (2001), Bundesanstalt f ur Arbeit (2002)
While the eastern labour market suered from the Re-Unication, the western labour market boomed.
The labour force rose both by the immigrants from the eastern part and abroad. Together with a strong
increase of employment between 1989 and 1992, the number of unemployed was reduced to 1.80 million.
In the years from 1993 to 1997 the western German labour market was aected by an economic slowdown,
a delayed eect of the global recession determined by the oil-price shock during and after the Gulf War.
In contrast to the eastern part, typical attributes of the economy and the labour market in the western
part are a strong export-dependence due to production of superior industrial goods and an increasing
services-sector. In these years unemployment rose heavily up to 3.02 million in the yearly average. In
the end of the 1990s the western German labour market recovered. Between 1997 and 2000 the number
of unemployed decreased again but was still persistent on a level around 2.5 million.
In the rst half of the year 2000 the German economy had the biggest upswing since the Re-Unication.
Despite this, only the western labour market with its strong export-dependence proted. The higher
foreign demand did not aect the eastern part because of its minor importance in the export-sector.
Furthermore, the continuing structural problems and a reduced demand in the construction sector led
to a negative outcome. Since the second half of the year 2000, the German economy experiences a new
downswing. Consequently, unemployment rose again in both parts. Even though the gures in table 1
show a reduced number of unemployed and a reduced unemployment rate for western Germany in the
yearly average for the year 2001, this is only due to the reduced stock of unemployed in the beginning of
2001 resulting from the upswing in the rst half of 2000.
2.2. Active Labour Market Policies and Job Creation Schemes
The unsatisfying situation of the persistently increasing unemployment linked with a strained budget
situation led to a re-orientation of labour market policy. Mainly ALMP have become more important
during the last years. The reform of the Work Support Act (Arbeitsf orderungsgesetz) in 1997/1998
to the Social Code III (Sozialgesetzbuch III) re
ects this fact. A higher emphasis on 
exibility and
decentralisation of the labour market policy should enable a more ecient application of the instruments
3for the target groups as well as a higher self dependence of the local placement ocers. The primary
objective of ALMP in Germany is still the (re-) integration of unemployed into regular employment. The
main purpose of the employment promotion according to the Social Code III is to balance labour demand
and supply. Unemployment should be circumvented by an ecient lling of vacancies and the increase
of the individual employment chances due to an upgrade of the worker's human capital. Besides those
explicit postulations of the legislator for the design of the labour market policy, the evaluation of the
eort of the instruments is now legally anchored. The analysis of the eects of ALMP is now a focus
of labour market research in Germany. The purpose is a more contemporary evaluation of the dierent
instruments, considering aspects like the net-eect on the employment chances for an individual, the
identication of macroeconomic eects and cost-benet analysis.
Spending for ALMP amounts to more than 33.2% of the total expenditures for labour market policy in
West Germany and 41.6% in East Germany in 2001. The main instruments are vocational training and
subsidized employment. Vocational Training consists of several on-the-job and o-the-job measures for
unemployed and workers who are threatened by unemployment. The costs for these measures lie at 6.99
billion Euro and 449,622 individuals started training in 2001. On second place regarding the expenses
and the number of entries are the job creation schemes with a scal volume of 2.97 billion Euro and
192,037 newly promoted individuals in 2001 (Bundesanstalt f ur Arbeit, 2002).
Job Creation Schemes (xx 260-271, 416 Social Code III (SGB III), JCS) can be promoted if they
support activities which are of value for the society and additional in nature. Furthermore individuals have
to be employed whose last chance to stabilise and qualify for later re-integration into regular employment
is participation in these schemes. Additional in nature means that the activities could not be executed
without the subsidy. Measures with a predominantly commercial purpose have been excluded explicitly
up to January 2002; now they could be accomplished with a special permission by the administration
board of the local labour oce. Participants on JCS are allowed to do a practical training up to 40% of
the time and a vocational training up to 20%, together no more than 50% of the programme duration.
Priority should be given to projects which enhance the chances for permanent jobs, support structural
improvement in social or environmental services or aim at the integration of extremely hard-to-place
individuals.
Even though JCS are mainly accomplished by public and social institutions, they could also be organised
by the private sector if some special clauses to prevent substitution eects and windfall gains are regarded.
Besides the social value and the additional benet of the activities, participants in JCS in the private sector
should be from special target groups of the labour market, e.g. young unemployed without professional
training, and get educational supervision during occupation.
The legal requirements for individuals to enter JCS are relaxed by the SGB III amendment (Job-Aqtiv-
Gesetz) in January 2002. Before that day, potential participants had to be long-term unemployed (more
than one year) or unemployed for at least six months within the last twelve months. Additionally
they had to full the conditions for the entitlement of unemployment compensation.2 In addition, the
2There are two kinds of unemployment compensation in Germany. The rst kind are unemployment benets (UB) that
are paid dependent on the preceding duration of employment, the age and if the individual has children. To get UB, an
individual must register unemployed at the local labour oce, seek for a regular occupation and have worked as a regular
employed before. The UB amounts to 60% (67%) of the net-wage of the last occupation for unemployed without (with)
children. The longest possible UB entitlement is 32 months. After expiration of the UB entitlement, unemployed can gain
unemployment assistance (UA) if they are in need of further promotion. In analogy to the UB entitlement, the UA diers
dependent on having or not having children. The amount of UA for persons without (with) children is 53% (57%) of the
4local placement ocers were allowed to place up to ve percent of the allocated individuals who do
not meet these conditions (Five-Percent-Quota). Further exceptions are made for young unemployed
(under 25 years) without professional training, short-term unemployed (with at least three months of
unemployment) placed as tutors, and disabled who could be stabilised or qualied.
With the 2002 amendment, all unemployed individuals can enter a JCS independent of the preceding
unemployment duration, but with the restriction that JCS is the only opportunity for occupation. In
addition, the Five-Percent-Quota was augmented up to ten percent. The subsidy is normally paid for
12 months, but can be extended up to 24 or even 36 months, if it is followed by regular employment.
Even though JCS should be co-nanced measures where between 30% and 75% of the costs are subsidies
by the FEO and the rest is paid by the supporting institution (public or private legal entities, mainly
municipalities), exceptions can be made in the direction of a higher subsidy-quota (up to 100%).
Participation in JCS results from placement by the local labour oce. Unemployed individuals, who
cannot be integrated into regular employment or do not t the conditions for another instrument of active
labour market policy are oered a place in JCS. JCS can be implemented in nine dierent sectors. Since
the denition of this sector-structure comes from the mid 1980s, the changes due to the Re-Unication,
the new orientation of the labour market policy and the labour environment in the 1990s and 2000s are
not regarded. In our study we focus on the main four sectors `Agriculture', `Construction & Industry',
`Oce & Services' and `Community Sercives'. The rest is summarized in the sector `Other'. In the
placement process the unemployed individual is oered a specic job in one measure where a place is
available and which ts his characteristics. The placement ocer can cancel the treatment before the
regular end if the participating individual can be placed in the rst labour market. If an unemployed
rejects the oer of a JCS or if a participant denies a career counselling by the placement ocer, the labour
oce can stop the unemployment benets for up to twelve weeks. However, due to legal restrictions the
use of this penalty is negligible.
3. Dataset and Descriptive Analysis
Data Base The empirical analysis is based on a data set matched from several administrative data
sources of the FEO. The central source of information used is a prototype version of the programme
participants' master data set (Manahmeteilnehmergrunddatei, MTG). This data set includes information
on all participants in subsidized employment in Germany. The attributes are taken from three separate
data sources of the FEO, the job-seekers' data base (BewA), an adjusted version of this source for
statistical purposes (ST4) and the participants' data base of subsidized employment (ST11TN). The
MTG contains a large number of attributes to describe several individual aspects that can be split
into four classes: socio-demographic and qualication information, labour market history and particular
programme information. To describe the regional context we used the employment oces' data base
(ST1VOR). Table 2 gives detailed information of the data sources and the included attributes.
Our analysis builds on a sample from the MTG of all 11,376 participants, who entered job creation
schemes in February 2000. Only the rst programme participation is evaluated, any participation in later
programmes, e.g. vocational training, is viewed as an outcome of the rst treatment.3 The comparison
last net-wage. The UA is paid for one year at maximum, but can be prolonged by case-wise revision. For every following
year the grants are paid on a p.a. 3% reduced last net-income basis. Participation in a job creation scheme prolongs the
entitlement for UB in the same way as regular employment.
3See Lechner and Miquel (2001) for an approach to evaluate dynamic programme sequences.
5Table 2: Data Sources and Attributes
Data Source Attributes
MTG1 BewA and ST42 a) socio-demographic: age, gender, marital status, number of chil-
dren, nationality, handicap
b) qualication: graduation, professional training, occupational
group, position in last occupation, work experience, appraisal of
qualication by the placement ocer
c) labour market history: duration of unemployment, duration of
last occupation, number of job oers, occupational rehabilitation,
programme participation before unemployment
ST11TN3 d) programme: supporter of programme, activity sector, share of
qualication and practical training in programme, begin and end
of programme, entry and leaving of the participant, duration of
promotion
ST1VOR4 e) regional context: number of inhabitants in employment oce's
area, unemployment rate, number of unemployment, number of va-
cancies, underemployment rate
1 Programme participants' master data set (Manahmeteilnehmergrunddatei, MTG)
2 Job-seekers' data base (Bewerberangebotsdatei, BewA) and adjusted version for statistical purposes (ST4)
3 Programme participants' of subsidized employment data set (ST11TN)
4 Data set containing labour oce information (ST1VOR)
group consists of 232,399 individuals who met the institutional conditions for participation in job creation
schemes in January 2000, but did not enter those schemes in the observation period. The sample was
drawn from the job-seekers' data base and the attributes from the ST4 were added. The unemployment
status of all individuals was tracked until March 2002.
Descriptive Analysis Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix show selected descriptive statistics of the
participants in the ve programme sectors and for the group of non-participants. Heterogeneity with
respect to programme and individual characteristics becomes obvious by these statistics. For instance,
the average duration of unemployment before programme participation varies in the ve sectors and
also between East and West Germany. Individuals who participate in programmes in the `Community
Services' sector have the shortest duration of unemployment in West Germany with 53.1 weeks on average,
in East Germany these are the participants in the `Construction & Industry' sector (53.1 weeks). In both
regions the longest duration of unemployment are found for participants in `Agriculture' (West: 66.8,
East: 64.1 weeks). The duration of unemployment of the non-participants is notably longer than for the
participants. This might be due to the fact that programme participation censors the unemployment
duration in the group of participants. Besides the varying average duration of unemployment before
programme also the programme duration varies. Longest promotion is given in the services' sectors
(`Oce & Services', `Community Services'), where in particular higher qualied individuals work.
The placement of participants seems to be oriented on the individual skills. Whereas the biggest group
of participants in `Agriculture' and `Construction & Industry' comes from manufacturing, the services
sectors are dominated by service professions. The qualication level of participants is very low on average.
Apart from the services in East and West, the quota of individuals without professional training and with-
out CSE is higher than in the group of non-participants. Consequently, the group of non-skilled workers
as a professional rank is, apart from the services sectors, larger in the participants' group compared to
the non-participants.
Furthermore, there are interesting regional dierences in JCS. The average age of participants is about six
6to nine years higher in East than in West Germany. Women are higher represented in the eastern part.
Here, particularly in `Community Services' and `Oce & Services' there are 81.4% and 76.3% female
participants. In contrast, the proportion of women in West Germany in `Agriculture' and `Construction
& Industry' amounts only to 7.4% and 9.4%.
The underemployment rate in the labour oce district can be interpreted as an indicator for the condition
of the regional labour market.4 The gures portray the special situation of the labour market in Germany
(see above). While the majority of the labour oce districts in West Germany has an underemployment
rate between 7.5% to 15.0%, for East Germany it lies between 22.5% to 30%.
4. Methodology
4.1. General Framework
The standard model in the microeconometric evaluation literature is the potential outcome approach or
Roy(1951)-Rubin(1974)-model. In this model an individual can choose between two states, e.g. either
participating in a certain labour market programme or not. The individual has then two potential
outcomes, where Y 1 is a situation with treatment and Y 0 is a situation without treatment. If we use
D 2 f0;1g as a binary treatment indicator, the actually observed outcome for any individual i can be
written as: Yi = Y 1
i D+(1 D)Y 0
i . Since we cannot observe the same individual in both states at the same
time, we have to to deal with a counterfactual situation and the so-called fundamental evaluation problem.
The parameter which receives most attention in the evaluation literature is the `average treatment eect
on the treated' (ATET), that is: E[Y 1   Y 0jD = 1]. Estimating this eect requires to make inference
about the outcome that would have been observed for participants had they not participated. In social
experiments where eligible persons are randomly denied access to the programme, the randomized-out
control group provides a direct estimate of E[Y 0jD = 1], whereas in nonexperimental studies no such
direct estimate is available (Smith and Todd (2000)).
When evaluating the active labour market policies of countries, researchers are usually not confronted
with only one homogeneous programme, but with a variety of dierent ones, e.g. wage subsidies, training
programmes or job creation schemes. Even when looking at one specic programme, like in our case
job creation schemes, the sub-parts of the programme may be very heterogeneous regarding the type of
occupation, intensity, duration, etc. To account for programme heterogeneity, the standard evaluation
framework has been extended by Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001). The multiple treatment framework
considers the case of (M + 1) mutually dierent and exclusive treatments instead of just two. For every
individual only one component of the M dierent outcomes fY 0;Y 1;:::;Y Mg can be observed, leaving
M   1 as counterfactuals. Participation in treatment m is indicated by S 2 f0;1;:::;Mg.
An important concept in this framework is the stable unit-treatment value assumption (SUTVA)5 , which
requires that the potential outcomes of an individual depend on his own participation only and not on the
treatment status of other individuals. Furthermore, whether an individual participates or not does not
depend on the participation decision of other individuals. The latter requirement excludes peer-eects,
whereas the rst one excludes cross-eects or general equilibrium eects (Sianesi (2001b)).
4The underemployment rate is dened as the sum of openly unemployed and programme participants in relation to the
labour force.
5See Rubin (1980) or Holland (1986) for a further discussion of this concept.
7The interest lies in the causal eect of one treatment relative to another treatment on an outcome variable.
Even though Lechner (2001) denes several interesting parameters, we will focus on the ATET.6 In the
multiple-treatment notation that eect is dened as a pair-wise comparison of the eects of the treatments
m and l for for an individual randomly drawn of participants in m only:
ml
0 = E(Y m   Y l j S = m) = E(Y m j S = m)   E(Y l j S = m): (1)
It is worth noting that this treatment eect is not symmetric if the participants in m and l dier in a
non-random fashion which is related to the outcomes. In the presented framework the causal treatment
eect is generally not identied. To overcome the counterfactual situation identifying assumptions have
to be invoked which are generally untestable. The most common assumption in this context is the
conditional independence assumption (see e.g. Rubin (1977)), which requires that treatment participation
and treatment outcomes are independent conditional on a set of observable characteristics X.7 Imbens
(2000) and Lechner (2001) consider identication under CIA in the multiple treatment framework and
formalise it in the following way:
Y 0;Y 1;:::;Y M q S j X = x;8x 2 :8 (2)
That is, all potential treatment outcomes are independent of the assignment mechanism for any given
value of a vector of attributes, X, in an attribute space,  (Lechner (2002a)). For this assumption to be
fullled, the researcher has to observe all characteristics that jointly in
uence the participation decision
and the outcomes and therefore its plausibility depends on the dataset at hand. Assumption (2) is too
restrictive if the parameter of interest is the mean eect of treatment on the treated, since in that case
conditional mean independence suces (Smith and Todd (2000)). However, Lechner (2002b) argues that
the CIA has the virtue of identifying the mean eects for all transformations of the outcome variables
and furthermore it will be dicult to argue why conditional mean independence should hold and CIA
might still be violated in empirical studies.
Conditioning on all relevant covariates is, however, limited in case of a high dimensional vector X ('curse
of dimensionality'). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show for the single treatment case that it is not
necessary to condition on X, but instead it is sucient to use so-called balancing scores, i.e. functions
of the relevant observed covariates. A balancing score b(X) is a function of X, such that conditional on
it, the characteristics X are balanced across the groups, i.e. S q X j b(X).
The propensity score P m(X), i.e. the probability of participating in a programme, is one possible
balancing score. It summarises the information of the observed covariates into a single index function.
Lechner (2001) shows that a generalisation of the balancing score property holds for the case of multiple
treatments as well:
Y 0;Y 1;:::;Y M q S j X = x ! Y 0;Y 1;:::;Y M q S j b(X) = b(x);8x 2 :9 (3)
6Other parameters of interest are e.g. the average treatment eect of treatment m relative to treatment l for persons
randomly drawn from the population or randomly drawn from participants in either m or l.
7These variables are unaected by treatment and called attributes by Holland (1986).
8This identifying assumption is termed `strong unconfoundness' by Imbens (2000).
9See Appendix A in Lechner (2001) for a proof.
8Given that, the ATET (here: eect of treatment m compared with treatment l on the participants in
treatment m) can be written as (Lechner (2002a)):
ml
0 = E(Y m j S = m)   EP ljml[EfY l j Pljml(X);S = lg j S = m]; (4)
where: P ljml(x) = P ljml(S = l j S 2 l;m;X = x) =
Pl(x)
Pl(x) + P m(x)
:
The marginal probability of treatment j conditional on X is denoted as P(S = j j X = x) = P j(x). ml
0
is identied and the dimension of the estimation problem is reduced to one. It is interesting to note that if
Pljml is modelled directly, no information from subsamples other than those containing participants in m
and l is needed for the identication of (4) and we are basically back in the binary treatment framework.
Since the choice probabilities in (4) will not be known a-priori, they have to be replaced by an estimate,
e.g. a probit model. If all values of m and l are of interest, the whole sample is needed for identication.
In that case either the binary conditional probabilities can be estimated or a structural approach can be
used where a complete choice problem is formulated in one model and estimated on the full sample, e.g.
multinomial probit model.
4.2. A Matching Estimator for the Evaluation Problem at Hand
Once the score is available, an estimator is needed that exploits CIA but avoids almost any other as-
sumption (Lechner (2002b)). One popular choice in this context is the matching estimator.10 The basic
idea underlying the matching approach on balancing scores is to replace the second term on the right
hand side of equation (1), that is E(Y l j S = m), by a selected group of participants in l that has
the same distribution for the balancing score as the group of participants in m. Given the balancing
property, the distribution of X will also be balanced in the two samples. Besides being an intuitively
appealing approach and therefore easy to communicate to policy makers, the matching approach avoids
functional form assumptions and allows the eects to be dierent in specic sub-populations (individual
heterogeneity). Furthermore it allows to take account for the fact that the evaluated programmes are not
homogeneous (programme heterogeneity, Lechner (2002b)).
When discussing the suitable approach to be used in this application, we have to bear several things
in mind. First, the descriptive statistics have shown that the participants in both regions and in the
dierent measures are very heterogeneous. Therefore the possible in
uence of regional, individual and
programme heterogeneity has to be considered. Second, as has been described in the previous section,
the decision process on which programme to choose is a binary one, making a multinomial approach
unappropriate. Furthermore, the policy-relevant question to answer is, if - in order to enhance their
employment prospects - unemployed in February 2000 should be placed in a job creation scheme or not.
In the latter case individuals would have to seek a job without the additional benet of the programme.
Finally, the group of non-participants is between twenty and fourty times larger than the group of
participants in any sub-part of the programme.
10Recent applications of matching estimation can be found in Gern and Lechner (2000), Sianesi (2001b) or Brodaty,
Crepon, and Fougere (2001) for Switzerland, Sweden and France. More methodological aspects are discussed e.g. in
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998), Smith and Todd (2000) and Blundell and Costa Dias (2000).
9Eects in Sub-Populations Therefore we decided to estimate the eects of the dierent programmes
in the dierent sub-populations relative to non-participation only. Since we are just interested in the pair-
wise comparison of the various kinds of treatments, assumption (2) can be relaxed, requiring conditional
independence to hold only for the sub-population receiving either treatment m or treatment l (see Lechner
(2001) and Sianesi (2001a)), where treatment l is our non-participation state and m 2 f1;:::;5g11 :
ml
0 = E(Y m   Y l j S = m) = E(Y m j S = m)   E(Y l j S = m) (5)
for m = 1;:::;5:
Estimating the eects separately for men and women in East and West Germany for the dierent sectors m
accounts for regional, gender-specic and programme heterogeneity. To allow additionally for individual
heterogeneity we also estimate the eects for various strata of the population. This stratication is
orientated by the target groups of JCS.
Since young unemployed without profession are one target group, one obvious criterion to look at is the
age of participants. Besides that, JCS should also stabilise `older' unemployed with bad labour market
prospects, so we examine the eects in three dierent age classes (<25, 25-50, >50 years):
ml
0a = E(Y m   Y l j S = m) = E(Y m j S = m)   E(Y l j S = m) (6)
for m = 1;:::;5 and a = Age<25;Age25 50;Age>50:
Another particular target group are long-term unemployed. Therefore our second criterion is the duration
of previous unemployment (again in three classes: <13, 13-52, >52 weeks):
ml
0u = E(Y m   Y l j S = m) = E(Y m j S = m)   E(Y l j S = m) (7)
for m = 1;:::;5 and u = UN<12;UN13 24;UN>24:
Matching Algorithm Several dierent matching estimators have been discussed (see e.g. Heckman,
Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) or Smith and Todd (2000)) and the exact protocol of the one used
in that application can be found in Table A.4. The choice of the matching method involves a trade-o
between matching quality and variance. First, one has to decide on how many non-treated individuals
to match to a single treated individual. Nearest-neighbour (NN) matching only uses the participant and
its closest neighbour. Therefore it minimizes the bias but might also involve an eciency loss, since a
large number of close neigbours are disregarded. Kernel-based matching on the other hand uses more
non-treaties for each participant thereby reducing the variance but possibly increasing the bias. Finally,
using the same non-treated individual more than once (NN matching with replacement) can possibly
improve the matching quality, but increases the variance.12 Since we have a large sample of participants
and an even larger sample of non-participants, we use NN matching without replacement for our study.13
11The ve sectors of the programme are: `Agriculture', `Construction & Industry', `Oce & Services', `Community
Services' and `Other'.
12Following Lechner (2001), the variance of the treatment eect at time t is calculated by assuming independent observa-
tions, xed weights, homoscedasticity of the outcome variable within the treatment and within the control group and that
the outcome does not depend on the propensity score: V ar(^ ml
N ) = (Nm) 1 V ar(Y m j S = m)+[(i2l(wm
i )2)=((Nm)2)]
V ar(Y l j S = l); where Nm is the number of matched treated in programme m and wi is the number of times control i has
been used, where i2l(wm
i ) = 1. The left term can be re-written as:(Nm) 1  [(i2l(wm
i )2)=(Nm)]  V ar(Y l j S = l): If no
unit is matched more than once, the formula conincides with the 'usual' variance formula.
13The sensitivity of the results has been tested with respect to matching with replacement, but no signicant dierences
could be found.
10Common Support A further requirement besides independence is the common support condition. It
requires that all individuals in that subspace actually can participate in all states:
0 < P(S = mjX = x) < 1;8m = 0;::::;M;8x 2 : (8)
If there are regions where the support of X does not overlap for the dierent groups, matching is only
justied when performed over the common support region and the estimated treatment eect must
then be redened as the treatment impact for programme participants whose probabilities lie within the
overlapping support region (Smith and Todd (2000)).
Match Quality Since we do not condition on all covariates but on the propensity score, it has to be
checked if the matching procedure is able to balance the distribution of the relevant variables in the control
and treatment groups. One suitable indicator to assess the distance in the marginal distributions of these
characteristics is the standardized bias suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). For each covariate
X it is dened as the dierence of the sample means in the treated and matched control subsamples as a
percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in both groups (Sianesi (2001b)).14
When to compare An important decision which has to be made in the empirical analysis is when to
measure the eects. The major goal is to ensure that treaties and non-treaties are compared in the same
economic environment and the same individual lifecycle position. One possible problem which has to be
taken into account is the occurrence of locking-in eects. The literature is dominated by two approaches,
either comparing the individuals from the begin of the programme or after the end of the programme. The
latter alternative implies, that the outcome of participants who nish the programme in October 2000 and
re-enter the labour market in November 2000, is compared with matched non-participants in November
2000. This approach is problematic if the exits are spread over a longer time period because possibly very
dierent economic situations are compared. A further problem which arises with this approach is that it
entails an endogeneity problem (Gern and Lechner (2000)). A second approach which is predominant in
the recent literature (see e.g. Sianesi (2001b) or Gern and Lechner (2000)) and which is also used here,
measures the eects from the begin of the programme. Since one entry condition for the participants is
that they had to be unemployed (at least) in January 2000, the control group has been chosen in the
way that they fulll this condition, too.15 So basically, the policy-relevant question is if the placement
ocer should place an unemployed individual in February 2000 in a JCS or not. Therefore comparing
both groups from the begin of the programme seems to be a reasonable approach.
Locking-in Eect What should be kept in mind is the possible occurrence of locking-in eects for the
group of participants. Since they are involved in the programme, they do not have the same time to search
for a new job as non-participants. Following van Ours (2002), the net eect of a programme consists of
two opposite eects. First, the increased employment probability through the programme and second,
the reduced search intensity. Since both eects cannot be disentangled, we only observe the net eect
and have to take this into account when interpreting the results. As to the fall in the search intensity we
should expect an initial negative eect from any kind of participation in a programme. However, since
14That is 100  (X1   X0M)=f
p
(V1(X) + V0M(X))=2g, where X1 (V1) is the mean (variance) in the treated group and
XOM ((V0M) is the mean in the matched control group.
15In fact, the average duration of unemployment in January 2000 is 72.31 (65.93) weeks for the non-participants and
between 53.13 (53.10) and 66.79 (64.11) weeks for the participants in the dierent sectors in West (East) Germany.
11we observe the outcome of the individuals until two years after the begin of the programme a successful
programme should overcompensate for this initial fall.
5. Empirical Analysis
5.1. Implementation
Plausibility of CIA in our Context Before starting with the estimation of the propensity scores,
we have to consider brie
y the plausibility of the CIA in our context. As already noted for the CIA
to be fullled we need to condition on all variables that jointly in
uence the participation decision
and the outcome variable. The used dataset contains four dierent categories of variables. First, socio-
demographic variables like age, gender, marital status, number of children, etc. Second, information about
the qualicational background, e.g. education, occupational group, professional rank and work experience.
Third, the dataset also includes, and that is most important since previous studies have emphasized the
importance of the labour market history, career details. In this category, we have information about the
duration of the last employment and unemployment which leaves us on average with a labour market
history of two years before the programme started. Furthermore, this category also contains information
about placement restraints and the number of placement propositions. Finally, to take account for the
regional labour market situation, the fourth category includes the size of the labour oce district and
the underemployment rate of that region in the fourth quarter of 1999. Given this informative dataset,
we argue henceforth that the CIA holds.
Propensity Scores We estimated binary probits for every treatment group m 2 f1;:::;5g against the
group of non-participants. To take account for regional heterogeneity and to allow for gender-specic
interaction eects, the probits are estimated separately for men and women in East and West Germany,
leaving us with 18 probit estimations.16 The choice of the variables that are selected in the estimation
are based on score tests. The results can be found in tables A.5, A.6, A.7 and A.8 in the appendix.
It is worth noting that the parameters of the choice estimations not only diverge with respect to regional
dierences but also with respect to gender-specic and programme-specic aspects. For example, married
men ( 0:1189) and women ( 0:2047) in West Germany have a lower probability to participate in a
programme in the sector `Community Services' than men (0:2496) and women (0:0696) in East Germany.
A good example for the programme-specic dierences is the in
uence of age for the participation decision.
Whereas age has a negative impact on the probability for men in West Germany to join the sector
`Construction & Industry' ( 0:0588), it has a positive impact for joining `Oce & Services' (0:1187).
There is a strong tendency for men with health restrictions to take up a programme in the `Oce &
Services' sector. People with higher qualications (College or University degree, Polytechnic or technical
school) tend to go in the sectors `Oce & Services' or `Community Services'. It is quite interesting to note,
that in comparison to people without completed professional training, all other individuals have a negative
probability to go in the `Agriculture' sector. The in
uence of the former profession is straightforward in
most of the sub-groups. Individuals who have been in manufacturing have a higher probability of ending
up in the sectors `Agriculture' or `Construction & Industry'. In contrast to this, individuals with service
16Since the number of participating women in West Germany in the sectors `Agriculture' and `Construction & Industry'
has been too small, they have been excluded from estimation. We also estimated the propensity scores for the two regions
with dummy variables for the sex. However, using the results of these 10 probits leads to a worse matching quality.
12Table 3: Loss of observations due to the common support requirement (in %)
West Germany East Germany
Men Women Men Women
Part. Non-Part. Part. Non-Part. Part. Non-Part. Part. Non-Part.
Agriculture 0.74 7.32 - - 0.11 0.61 0.11 2.46
Construction & Industry 0.25 17.22 - - 0.00 9.61 0.00 10.31
Oce & Services 1.47 20.14 0.94 13.31 0.50 29.89 0.15 3.88
Social Services 0.57 4.83 0.37 4.41 0.24 5.61 0.11 0.65
Other 0.12 2.80 0.00 6.74 0.10 0.67 0.14 2.66
 The total number of participants lost is 24.
{ Groups with less than 50 observations are omitted.
professions tend to go either in the sector `Oce & Services' or `Community Services'. An exception can
be found in East Germany where men coming from technical professions are more likely to participate
in `Oce & Services' compared to men coming from service professions. Other characteristics like the
number of placement propositions show the same trend for all groups and sectors. In general the people
with a higher number of placement propositions have a higher probability to join job creation schemes.
The list of examples is endless, but for the sake of brevity we stop commenting here. The interested
reader is referred to the tables in the appendix.
Common Support The estimated propensity scores are used for our matching procedure. To ensure
the common support requirement we had to delete some observations across the dierent subsamples.
Since we estimated pairwise eects between the ve dierent treatments vs. non-participation, we used
the criterion that all estimated probabilities in the particular subgroups are smaller than the smallest
maximum and larger than the largest minimum.17 The number of observations lost due to this require-
ment can be found in table 3. It can be seen that the number of participants lost in the specic subgroups
is fairly small. The maximum is 1:47% for men in West Germany who are in the `Oce & Services' sector,
whereas in all other subgroups the loss is below 1%. For the non-participants, however, the losses lie
between 0:61% and 29:89%. But since we had a much larger group of non-participants and furthermore
we are interested in the ATET only, this loss is negligible.
Matching Quality Since we do not condition on all covariates but on the propensity score, we check
the ability of the matching procedure to balance the relevant covariates by comparing the absolute bias
between the respective participating and non-participating groups before and after the matching took
place. The results can be found in table 4. The bias before matching lies between 10% and 20% and a
signicant reduction can be achieved for all subgroups so that the bias after matching is below 4% for
ten out of eighteen subgroups. For the rest of the subgroups the bias after matching is between 4:23%
and 6:20% (for men in West Germany in the sector `Oce & Services'). Given the fact that the bias for
the latter group has been 20:3% this is acceptable.
17Several other common support conditions have been suggested, e.g. Smith and Todd (2000) propose to use a `trimming
level' q. That is, not only observations with zero density but also those where the densities are positive but very low (below
q) are excluded from the analysis.











before 15.00 15.32 20.30 15.93 12.80
after 4.23 3.45 6.20 5.33 2.85
Women West
before { { 17.68 16.02 14.80
after { { 5.86 3.19 5.54
Men East
before 14.50 13.68 20.31 13.16 11.64
after 2.99 3.15 5.77 4.75 2.36
Women East
before 13.93 16.99 17.48 11.68 10.27
after 2.65 6.56 2.44 1.87 2.23
 The standardised bias is dened as: 100(X1  X0M)=f
p
(V1(X) + V0M(X))=2g. The `total'
bias has been estimated as an unweighted average of all covariates.
5.2. Results
Outcome Variable One major element of programme evaluation is the choice of a suitable outcome
variable. Since one goal of job creation schemes in Germany is the re-integration of unemployed in the
rst labour market, one obvious choice would be the employment status of the individuals.18 However,
our dataset does not contain the employment status but it allows us to monitor if the individual is
registered as a job-seeker or not. This information is divided into three categories. Individuals may be
either registered unemployed (category 1), registered as job-seeker but not unemployed (category 2) or
not registered as job-seeker (category 3). Since these formal denitions are not very enlightening, they
are best explained with some examples. The most straightforward category and the only one which does
not need an additional explanation is the rst one, i.e. the one which contains all unemployed people.
The second category contains all people who are registered as job-seekers but not as unemployed. Good
examples for this category are individuals in temporary employment, regular employed who are looking
for an alternative job and also individuals participating in an active labour market programme. Finally,
the last category (not registered as job seeker) includes individuals in regular employment. Unfortunately,
this category might also contain individuals on maternity leave or individuals who have just retired. Table
5 summarises the available information.
Especially the second category is hard to assess, as an individual in that category might on the one hand
be regularly employed or on the other hand participate in another labour market programme. Assessing
people in that category as a failure might therefore lead to an underestimation of the treatment eect,
whereas an assessment of them as a success would lead to an overestimation. To overcome this problem
we estimate lower and upper bounds for the true treatment eect (success probability on the labour
market). For the lower bound we only rate people in the last category as a success, whereas for the upper
bound the categories two and three are the success criterion. The true success probability will lie within
this boundaries. Obviously, the time during the programme is rated as a failure for the participants.
Outcomes over Time At rst we will take a look at the success probabilities of participating in-
dividuals over time. We estimated the eects for the participants from March 2000 until March 2002.
18Other goals besides that, e.g. social stabilisation, cannot be evaluated here.
14Table 5: Lower and upper bounds for the outcome variable
Status Denition Rating
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Registered unemployed
(category 1)




king, but not unemplo-
yed (category 2)
Individuals, who are registered as job-seeking at the
labour oce, but not as unemployed. These are for
example employees in regular employment, who are
threatened by unemployment or seeking for another
occupation, participants in active labour market pol-
icy programmes.
Success
Not registered as job-
seeker (category 3)
Persons, who are not registered as job-seeking at the
labour oce, for example individuals in regular em-
ployment, maternity leave or retirement.
Success
Participation in JCS reduces the search intensity during the programme period; therefore one has to
consider the monthly exit rates of participants for interpretation, which are given in table A.3. As can be
seen, the exit-rate for men in West Germany lies around 5% per month during the rst eleven months of
the programme (for women slightly lower); after one year (February 2001) the exit-rate reaches its peak
with 34.65% (women: 39.41%). By that time 91.6% (86.4%) of all men (women) have left the programme.
At the same time 93.5% (93.1%) of all men (women) have left the programmes in East Germany, too. An
interesting dierence is that the peak of exits here is much more pronounced after twelve months (Men:
69.42%, women: 72.51%). That means that we observe the outcome for the majority of individuals for
at least one year after the programme ends, even though for some individuals the observed time horizon
is up to 23 months. In that sense we can only make statements regarding the short-term eects of the
programmes. Given these exit rates, a locking-in eect during the rst months after programme start
has to be expected.
Figures B.1 and B.2 show the success probabilities, i.e. the dierences in the outcomes between partici-
pants and matched non-participants, for West and East Germany over time. The success probabilities are
dierentiated by gender and the ve sectors. Since the number of female participants in West Germany
in the sectors `Agriculture' and `Construction & Industry' has been too small (43 and 41), these sectors
have been excluded from the analysis. The gures show the lower- and upper bounds of the true treat-
ment eect. An eect below the zero line means that the participants have on average a lower success
probability than the matched non-participants.
The expected locking-in eects are clearly visible during the rst months after programme start. Es-
pecially in East Germany the success probabilities are strongly decreasing in the rst months, reaching
their lowest value in the autumn of 2000. After that the eects are upward sloping. In West Germany a
similar pattern can be found, even though the decrease in the beginning is not so pronounced due to the
dierent exit behaviour.
As noted above we have estimated a lower- and an upper-bound for the eects. In most cases the lower
bound of the eects lies in the rst months above the upper bound which might be somewhat confusing.
However, this is easy understandable if one looks at the construction of these bounds. The analysed
participation (rst treatment) is taken as a failure in both scenarios. Due to the fact that individuals
from the control group may enter the category 2 status (registered job-seekers but not unemployed)
15and are then judged as a success in the upper-bound scenario, the upper-bound slips under the lower-
bound because nearly all participants are still in the programmes at that time. Since we cannot separate
the locking-in eect from the treatment eect, we will start our interpretation when the majority of
participants has left their programmes, that is after March 2001. Another consequence of the denition
of the upper-bound in connection with using the rst treatment as a failure is an abrupt rise in the success
probabilities after most programmes have ended. Almost all gures show this instance in February/March
2001. For some groups, e.g. men in `Agriculture' or `Construction & Industry' in West Germany, this
rise begins earlier due to shorter treatment durations.
While the mean upper-bounds surge in March 2001 (after the majority of individuals have left the
programmes), the lower-bounds of the success probabilities are increasing only slowly. This results in a
clear spread between the lower- and the upper-bounds of the success probabilities. The spread indicates
a high proportion of participants, who could leave open unemployment after treatment, but are still
registered job-seekers.
Since the purpose of JCS is to stabilise and qualify unemployed for the re-integration into regular em-
ployment, we expect an increasing success probability for participants after the programmes end. Due
to the strong locking-in eect, the starting position for participants is on average lower than for the non-
participants. However, since we observe the outcomes until two years after start of the programmes and
one year after the majority of the individuals has left the programmes, a successful programme should
overcompensate for this initial fall.





























Men -11.94 -1.68 -19.39 -11.99 -16.42 -3.73 -15.85 -6.34 -17.78 -9.43
Women { { { { -18.10 -4.29 -15.95 -4.13 -14.33 -4.44
East-Germany
Men -25.32 -12.54 -12.29 -2.95 -17.91 -2.49 -21.79 -3.39 -23.26 -12.96
Women -13.59 -6.30 -15.96 -2.13 -14.51 2.16 -11.53 3.86 -14.76 -1.29
Bold letters indicate signicance at the 1% level, Italic letters refer to the 5% level.
{ Eects for groups with less than 50 observations are omitted.
Programme Heterogeneity Table 6 summarizes the eects for the treatment groups in the ve
sectors in March 2002 the end of our observation period. To give an example for the interpretation let
us look at the eect for East German women in `Agriculture'. The lower bound of the eect is -13.59%,
the upper bound is -6.38%. That means that participants have a success probability which is between
6.38% and 13.59% lower as the success probability of non-participants. The dierences between the
sectors are enormous, e.g. the lower bounds of the eects for men in East Germany lie between -12.29%
(`Construction & Industry') and -25.32% (`Agriculture').
What is most striking is the fact that the success probabilities are signicant negative for nearly all of
the groups and sectors. The only exception are women in East Germany who participate in `Community
16Services'. The upper-bound eect for this group is 3.86%. However, the lower bound for this group
amounts to -11.53%. Since the true treatment eect lies somewhere between these boundaries, we cannot
identify a persuasive positive eect.
Clearly some programmes are better than others, but overall none of these programmes helps its partic-
ipants to have a higher success probability than non-participants two years after start. The programmes
which are most harmful for participating individuals in West Germany are `Construction & Industry' for
men (-19.39% / -11.99%) and `Oce & Services' for women (-18.10% / not signicant). In East Germany
`Agriculture' is the worst programme for men (-25.32% / -12.84%) and `Construction & Industry' is the
worst for women (-15.96% / not signicant). As all eects (apart from the upper bound of women in
East Germany in `Community Services') lie below that of the matched non-participants, JCS seem to
have no positive impact on the success probabilities for participants up to 24 months after treatment.
Outcomes for the Sub-Populations What is left, is to examine the individual heterogeneity. Even
though the programmes do not work for the participants as a whole, it might be the case that they work
for some sub-populations. One could assume e.g., that they are especially eective for the explicit target
groups of JCS. Table 7 shows the eects on the success probabilities for the six sub-populations under
consideration 24 months after programmes start. Besides the lower- and upper-bounds of the eects, the
number of participants in the respective strata is given. Sub-groups with less than 50 observations were
excluded from the analysis.
The only signicant positive eect can be found for women between 26 and 50 years who participate
in the sector `Community & Services' in East Germany; their eect lies between -7.87% and 7.78%.
For the rest of the groups the eects are at best insignicant. However, for the majority of the groups
a participation in JCS has strongly negative impacts two years after programme start. Surprisingly,
even the target groups (young and long-term unemployed) have no signicant positive eects. On the
contrary, long-term unemployed (over 52 weeks) men in East Germany have success probabilities between
-25.83% (lower-bound for `Construction & Industry') and -12.14% (upper bound for `Other'). For the
long-term unemployed men and women in West Germany as well as for women in East Germany only few
signicant (all negative) results can be found. Due to the limited number of observations an assessment
of the situation of young unemployed can only be given for a small number of groups. For women in
East Germany no signicant eects are found, young men in East Germany have eects between -20,75%
(lower-bound for `Agriculture') and -12.78% (upper-bound for `Other'). The eect for young men and
women participating in `Community Services' is similarly bad.
The worst success probabilities are estimated for older (over 50 years) men in East Germany throughout
all sectors. For older women in East Germany the situation is slightly better, even though the signicant
results still lie between -31.11% (lower bound for `Oce & Services') and -9.79% (upper bound for
`Community Services') and therefore below those of non-participants.
Considering dierent unemployment durations before treatment shows no dierent picture. The success
probabilities of the participants are here below those of the non-participants, too. Again, the eects are
at best insignicant. The worst eects can be found for men in West Germany who have been short-term
unemployed and participate in `Community Services' (-24.11% / -16.07%). Women in the same region
with an unemployment duration between 13 and 52 weeks participating in `Oce & Services' (-33.33%
/ -14.29%) are even worse o. In East Germany e.g. short-term unemployed men in the sector `Others'
17Table 7: Average eects (in %) for participants 24 months (Mar/02) after programme start
Agriculture Construction &
Industry
























Men in West Germany
Age (in years)
<26 -11.34 -5.15 98 -6.98 -3.10 130 { { { -19.30 -15.79 114 -15.65 -10.87 230
26-50 -10.37 0.29 349 -10.50 -6.39 219 -9.90 0.00 103 -10.15 0.00 198 -16.45 -7.79 463
>50 -8.70 3.26 93 { { { { { { { { { -23.29 -6.16 146
Unemployment duration (in weeks)
<13 -16.80 -5.60 126 -6.35 -1.59 126 { { { -24.11 -16.07 112 -16.13 -6.45 248
13-52 -17.88 -7.82 179 -15.67 -10.45 135 { { { -6.72 0.75 134 -18.25 -11.93 285
>52 -12.50 -3.02 235 -4.55 1.52 132 -5.88 11.76 69 -9.90 4.95 103 -16.72 -7.87 306
Women in West Germany
Age (in years)
<26 { { { { { { { { { -21.05 -14.04 114 -12.20 -7.32 82
26-50 { { { { { { -17.88 -1.32 152 -17.30 -3.81 342 -12.57 0.00 175
>50 { { { { { { { { { -3.85 7.69 79 { { {
Unemployment duration (in weeks)
<13 { { { { { { -22.45 -8.16 50 -18.75 -8.59 129 -18.29 -6.10 82
13-52 { { { { { { -33.33 -14.29 84 -19.23 -7.21 208 -29.13 -16.50 103
>52 { { { { { { 5.19 11.69 78 -14.21 -1.02 198 2.78 7.41 108
Men in East Germany
Age (in years)
<26 -20.75 -18.87 53 { { { { { { -17.46 -14.29 63 -20.30 -12.78 133
26-50 -15.53 -9.36 438 -8.17 -0.39 257 -9.20 8.05 87 -23.15 -6.02 217 -16.48 -7.96 542
>50 -42.33 -20.37 379 -39.66 -18.10 116 -36.04 -21.62 111 -38.81 -7.46 134 -40.16 -25.27 376
Unemployment duration (in weeks)
<13 -27.22 -13.29 158 -1.22 10.98 82 { { { -25.77 5.15 98 -27.19 -18.89 217
13-52 -22.29 -4.52 333 -9.20 6.32 174 -26.32 -8.42 95 -15.82 3.57 196 -20.53 -9.27 455
>52 -22.96 -14.51 379 -25.83 -19.21 151 -17.65 -1.47 69 -7.50 0.00 120 -22.69 -12.14 379
Women in East Germany
Age (in years)
<26 { { { { { { { { { -11.11 -8.33 73 -2.70 8.11 74
26-50 -15.01 -11.37 633 -10.32 5.56 126 -8.45 5.56 416 -7.87 7.78 1170 -11.04 0.52 970
>50 -19.69 -3.86 259 -30.36 -21.43 56 -31.11 -10.22 225 -25.87 -9.79 572 -23.73 -3.69 435
Unemployment duration (in weeks)
<13 -17.07 -4.88 83 { { { -24.42 -9.30 86 -22.16 0.00 186 -23.62 -8.04 199
13-52 -1.67 5.00 300 -27.14 -7.14 70 -21.53 -1.09 276 -13.24 4.72 764 -13.20 2.29 569
>52 { { { -21.59 -6.82 88 -10.42 3.13 288 -9.94 -0.46 865 -11.13 -0.56 711
Bold letters indicate signicance at the 1% level, Italic letters refer to the 5% level.
{ Eects for groups with less than 50 observations are omitted.
18(-27.19% / -18.89%) and women with 13-52 weeks of unemployment participating in `Construction &
Industry' (-27.14% / not signicant) have the most negative results.
5.3. Policy Implications
The main purpose of job creation schemes is the stabilisation and qualication of unemployed individuals
in order to re-integrate them into the rst labour market. Particular target groups are young unemployed
without professional training and long-term unemployed, even though the composition of the participants
in our dataset does not show a clear concentration on these groups. Table A.1 and A.2 show that the
majority of participants in West Germany throughout all sectors is between 25 and 50 years old. The
share of short-term unemployed is here higher than could be expected (between 21.26% and 32.26%). In
East Germany, the share of people between 25 and 50 years is even larger, whereas the share of young
unemployed only lies between 1.53% and 8.19%. With respect to unemployment duration the majority
of participants belongs to the target group.
To get a clear picture of the treatment eects we accounted for several sources of heterogeneity in
our estimation. Besides regional and gender-specic dierences we also allowed for programme and
individual heterogeneity. As expected the eects showed a wide span in dierent sub-populations and
dierent sectors of JCS. However, the most striking nding is that no signicant positive eects can
be established for any sub-population in any sector.19 The initial negative eect of participation could
not be overcompensated during our observation period until March 2002, even though most of the sub-
populations show increasing success probabilities after the rst months. Since we can observe the outcome
for the individuals for two years after the programme starts and for the majority of people for at least one
year after it ends, it is reasonable to assume that the locking-in eect is of minor importance in March
2002.
Thus, the question arises why participants have on average signicantly lower success probabilities on
the labour market than comparable non-participants. One reason might be the often cited `stigma-
eects'. If the programme is targeted at people with `disadvantages', there is always a risk that a possible
employee takes participation in such schemes as a negative signal concerning the expected productivity
or motivation. If that is the case, the hoped-for positive eects of JCS might vanish. Another reason
might be the already mentioned locking-in eect during the rst months of treatment. Even though
participants in JCS should continue searching for a new job, it is questionable whether this is realistic.
Due to their occupation in the programme they will have a reduced search intensity. This is only justiable
if one thinks that being in the measure per se will pay o later on, e.g. through positive eects on the
employability or increased human capital through qualication in the programme. It seems that neither
of the two goals (employability and qualication) can be achieved in a satisfying way which would result
in a positive success probability. Therefore it is debatable whether the design of the programmes is
appropriate. One possibility would be to shorten the treatment durations. To become employable i.e.
to give possible employers a positive signal it might be sucient to participate in a programme for less
than one year, which is the regular duration at the moment. Since JCS seem to miss the purpose of
qualifying participants for re-integration in the labour market, another proposition is a higher share of
qualifying elements during the programme. This might, together with regular inspections of the progress,
enhance the human capital of the participating individuals and therefore lead to noticeable increased
19The only exception is the upper-bound for women in `Community Services' in East Germany.
19success probabilities. Another issue is the massive utilisation of JCS particularly in East Germany.
Re
ecting the composition of the participating individuals, a special focus on target groups is not visible.
A clear concentration on the `disadvantaged' and a specic placement of participants with respect to
their qualication might be necessary. This would lead to a reduced number of participants and a
clearer focus on specic target groups. Given that, the additional nature of these schemes might be
unnecessarily restrictive. If JCS are not allowed to compete with regular employment, the benet out of
an occupation in these schemes might neither be comparable to real labour market experience. This might
undermine one of its explicit goals that is the qualication and stabilisation and nally re-integration of
the individual into the rst labour market. However, if the `disadvantages' of the target groups are too
strong, an integration into the rst labour market might be unlikely. In this case JCS might also be used
as a `social' policy, e.g. for stabilisation, crime prevention, etc. Obviously, a clear re-denition of goals
and target groups is a necessary precondition for such a step.
6. Summary and Outlook
This paper presents a microeconometric evaluation of job creation schemes in Germany. We focus on
the eects on the participating individuals and take several sources of heterogeneity into account. Since
previous empirical studies of these measures have been based on relatively small datasets, this is the rst
study which allows to draw policy-relevant conclusions. Our estimation is based on a very informative and
exhaustive dataset merged from dierent administrative sources of the FEO. It contains information on all
participants in job creation schemes who started their programme in February 2000. The pool of variables
can be dierentiated into four categories: Socio-demographic, qualication and career information as well
as regional context-variables to take account for the situation on the local labour market. The exhaustive
and informative dataset at hand justies the conditional independence assumption and therefore we
applied a matching estimator. Besides avoiding functional form assumptions, this estimator is intuitively
appealing and allows the eects to be dierent in specic sub-populations. Additionally, the multiple
treatment framework is used to take into account programme heterogeneity.
The eects are estimated separately for men and women in West and East Germany participating in
one of the ve biggest sectors of JCS, considering regional, gender-specic and programme heterogene-
ity. To allow additionally for individual heterogeneity we also estimate the eects for various strata of
the population, dened by age and the duration of previous unemployment. Our results show consid-
erable dierences with respect to these sources of heterogeneity. However, two things are very common
throughout all groups. First, a strong locking-in eect during the rst months of the programmes can
be found. Second, although the success probabilities are increasing in the following, the most striking
nding is that no signicant positive eects can be established for any sub-population at the end of our
observation period. Clearly, based on these ndings the design and implementation of JCS has to be
revised substantially. Some suggestions, like a shorter duration, a stricter concentration on specic target
groups and more qualication elements are discussed in the paper.
Three main points should be examined in further studies. First, the observation period should be extended
to check if there are any long-term eects of JCS which we could not detect yet. It can be argued that the
observation period is too short for the nal identication of the treatment eects, even though this seems
to be unlikely in our view. Second, the used outcome variable does not allow to identify if individuals are
re-integrated into regular employment. Even though this approach is comparable to our denition of the
20lower bound of the treatment eect, divergences have to be checked as soon as these data are available.
Third, the interactions between active and passive elements of labour market policies should be analysed.
It is a relevant question if JCS set the right incentives for the participating individuals, e.g. concerning
monetary aspects. In this context it would also be interesting to evaluate the eects of the programme
on the income of participants.
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Number 85,195 583 434 348 884 1,132
Means
Programme duration (days) { 262.41 276.28 319.11 294.49 281.97
Duration of unempl. (weeks) 72.31 66.79 53.66 63.65 53.13 58.98
Duration of last empl. (months) 64.96 14.82 17.47 29.67 21.26 20.34
Age 42.81 37.76 33.89 40.58 35.85 36.43
Number of placement propositions 3.15 8.14 6.38 8.28 6.25 7.11
German 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.94 0.89 0.83
Last contact to job center 2.46 2.29 2.38 2.72 2.57 2.41
Rehabilitation attendant 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.04
Placement restraints 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.15
Women 0.45 0.07 0.09 0.61 0.61 0.26
Work experience 0.91 0.90 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.84
Number of children 0.49 0.50 0.40 0.53 0.52 0.41
Married 0.56 0.36 0.34 0.44 0.35 0.34
Frequencies in %
Occupational group
cultivation, breeding, shery 2.92 16.30 8.06 1.44 2.04 5.74
mining, mineral extraction 0.39 0.34 0.46 0.09
manufacturing 36.35 51.63 62.21 8.05 23.42 47.35
technical professions 3.95 0.86 0.92 9.77 1.36 2.74
service professions 54.33 28.82 24.88 78.45 70.59 40.11
other professions 2.06 2.06 3.46 2.30 2.60 3.98
Professional training (PT)
without compl. PT, without CSE 14.00 33.28 31.34 3.74 12.44 22.53
without compl. PT, with CSE 36.70 37.22 44.01 23.56 37.33 38.87
industrial training 41.30 27.10 22.58 44.25 28.17 28.62
Full-time vocational school 1.60 0.17 0.69 2.87 2.26 0.88
Technical school 2.54 1.03 0.46 6.32 6.11 1.94
Polytechnic 1.17 0.34 0.23 5.75 6.11 2.30
College/ University 2.68 0.86 0.69 13.51 7.58 4.86
Professional rank
worker, not skilled worker 19.88 42.37 35.25 7.47 15.95 25.09
worker, skilled worker 10.36 5.32 6.68 4.02 4.41 7.24
WC1, simple occupations 11.48 2.06 2.76 21.26 15.16 6.63
WC1, advanced occupations 4.39 1.37 0.92 12.07 9.28 4.06
other 53.90 48.89 54.38 55.17 55.20 56.98
Underemployment rate of job center (4. quarter 1999)
< 10% 28.56 23.84 18.66 35.34 32.92 30.04
10%-12,5% 25.03 28.99 15.21 22.13 30.66 23.94
12,5%-15% 34.99 32.76 52.76 29.89 25.68 36.93
>15% 11.42 14.41 13.36 12.64 10.75 9.10
Age classes (in years)
< 25 11.14 19.21 33.87 7.76 25.79 27.56
25-50 53.54 64.49 54.38 73.28 61.09 56.36
> 50 35.32 16.30 11.75 18.97 13.12 16.08
Duration of unemployment in classes (in weeks)
< 13 26.36 24.19 32.26 21.26 27.26 29.15
13-52 33.81 32.25 35.02 36.49 38.69 34.28
> 52 39.83 43.57 32.72 42.24 34.05 36.57
1 WC=white-collar worker
2 The sector `Other' consists of `Forestry', `Trac Systems', `Supplemental Construction' and `Other'.










Number 147,204 1,791 595 851 2,229 2,529
Means
Programme duration (days) { 326.29 279.10 336.38 334.21 331.71
Duration of unempl. (weeks) 65.93 64.11 53.10 58.50 60.42 58.12
Duration of last empl. (months) 58.75 25.85 20.60 35.13 30.65 27.93
Age 42.71 44.52 42.91 46.10 43.92 43.33
Number of placement propositions 2.80 4.98 6.48 6.33 5.69 5.62
German 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99
Last contact to job center 2.77 2.59 2.42 2.58 2.60 2.60
Rehabilitation attendant 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05
Placement restraints 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.10
Women 0.54 0.51 0.32 0.76 0.81 0.59
Work experience 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.89
Number of children 0.53 0.67 0.60 0.65 0.68 0.61
Married 0.57 0.61 0.56 0.75 0.67 0.57
Frequencies in %
Occupational group
cultivation, breeding, shery 5.25 15.69 9.24 2.59 2.65 5.85
mining, mineral extraction 0.15 0.17 0.04
manufacturing 34.57 43.38 58.32 5.64 19.34 34.95
technical professions 4.44 2.90 2.52 16.10 4.49 6.45
service professions 53.16 37.30 29.58 75.68 72.99 51.96
other professions 2.42 0.56 0.34 0.54 0.75
Professional training (PT)
without compl. PT, without CSE 5.60 10.78 9.41 0.59 1.93 5.42
without compl. PT, with CSE 19.96 21.22 18.49 11.87 17.90 22.10
industrial training 66.05 63.87 69.92 57.34 62.27 58.96
Full-time vocational school 0.88 0.78 0.34 1.88 2.47 1.30
Technical school 4.32 1.95 1.34 16.69 10.86 7.83
Polytechnic 0.77 0.45 0.34 3.41 1.17 0.95
College/ University 2.41 0.95 0.17 8.23 3.41 3.44
Professional rank
worker, not skilled worker 20.40 38.19 36.47 12.93 21.44 26.18
worker, skilled worker 21.44 15.35 20.00 15.63 16.60 15.94
WC1, simple occupations 6.69 2.07 2.69 15.86 11.53 9.17
WC1, advanced occupations 1.89 0.78 0.50 3.88 2.47 1.42
other 49.58 43.61 40.34 51.70 47.96 47.29
Underemployment rate of job center (4. quarter 1999)
< 20% 2.45 0.61 2.86 0.82 2.42 3.44
20%-22,5% 6.44 6.20 12.27 10.58 6.42 4.63
22,5%-25% 37.88 27.19 23.19 32.78 36.61 46.30
25%-27,5% 18.31 18.09 25.88 19.27 22.52 12.89
27,5%-30% 23.18 25.68 25.55 26.79 19.61 23.13
> 30% 11.75 22.22 10.25 9.75 12.43 9.61
Age classes (in years)
< 25 11.77 4.58 6.72 1.53 6.10 8.19
25-50 55.04 59.80 64.37 58.99 62.23 59.75
> 50 33.19 35.62 28.91 39.48 31.67 32.07
Duration of unemployment in classes (in weeks)
< 13 24.85 13.46 18.82 14.57 12.74 16.45
13-52 35.19 35.34 41.01 43.48 43.07 40.45
> 52 39.96 51.20 40.17 41.95 44.19 43.10
1 WC=white-collar worker
2 The sector `Other' consists of `Forestry', `Trac Systems', `Supplemental Construction' and `Other'.
24Table A.3: Monthly programme exits (in %)
West East
Month Men Women Men Women
Mar 00 2.97 2.58 1.16 0.83
Apr 00 5.14 3.83 2.00 1.19
May 00 6.82 3.65 3.02 1.70
Jun 00 5.89 3.74 2.55 1.54
Jul 00 4.87 3.74 2.14 1.05
Aug 00 6.16 7.56 5.54 5.09
Sep 00 4.52 4.89 2.58 1.66
Oct 00 5.36 4.18 5.37 2.22
Nov 00 5.14 4.98 3.70 2.95
Dec 00 4.87 3.56 1.97 1.56
Jan 01 5.18 4.27 1.05 0.79
Feb 01 34.65 39.41 62.42 72.51
Mar 01 1.46 1.78 3.84 4.22
Apr 01 0.31 0.18 0.00 0.06
May 01 0.62 1.16 0.41 0.24
Jun 01 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.04
Jul 01 0.49 0.71 0.07 0.04
Aug 01 0.58 0.18 0.10 0.14
Sep 01 0.22 0.44 0.10 0.00
Oct 01 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.02
Nov 01 0.27 0.27 0.07 0.06
Dec 01 0.62 0.36 0.00 0.02
Jan 02 0.18 0.53 0.00 0.02
Feb 02 1.95 6.85 1.60 1.66
Mar 02 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.08
Table A.4: Matching Protocol for the estimation of ml
0
Step Description
1 Separate the treated individuals from the non-treated individuals and denote
the group of the treated individuals by m, the group of non-treated by l. Sep-
arate the group of treated individuals into ve groups m 2 f1;:::;5g, according
to the type of treatment they received.
2 Take all individuals in l and the rst group of individuals out of m and estimate
P
mjml. Order the units in the treatment group randomly.
3 Choose one unit out of the treatment group and delete it from the pool.
4 Find an individual in the subsample of individuals in l that is as close as
possible to the one chosen in 3 in terms of the estimated propensity score and
remove this observation.
5 Repeat 3 and 4 until no participant in m is left.
6 Compute the conditional expectation of the matched comparison group.
7 Go back to step 2 and repeat the steps 2-6 for all m.











the results of 6.









Variable Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe.
Constant -2.1362 -1.1336 -5.4904 -1.4569 -1.9879
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.0011 -0.0588 0.1187 -0.0517 -0.0283
Age2 -2.86E-05 0.0006 -0.0014 0.0005 0.0003
Married -0.0919 0.0640 -0.1436 -0.1189 -0.0997
Number of children 0.0385 0.0088 0.0420 0.0420 0.0156
German 0.1859 0.3127 0.1414 0.1441 0.1263
Health restrictions
no health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
accepted DoR1, 80% and over 0.4261 -0.2744 1.0743 0.3153 0.2827
accepted DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.3385 -0.0630 0.8938 0.4299 0.2685
accepted DoR, 30% to under 50% 0.5768 | 0.7942 0.6356 0.4030
accepted DoR, 30% to under 50% no equalisation 0.2177 -0.0812 0.5755 0.1112 -0.0155
remaining health restrictions 0.0326 -0.2155 0.1297 -0.0027 -0.0202
Qualication Variables
Professional training
without completed professional training, without CSE Ref. Ref. -0.1987 0.1680 0.2933
without completed professional training, with CSE -0.2404 -0.1405 -0.2378 0.0748 0.1562
Industrial training -0.3635 -0.4029 Ref. Ref. Ref.
Full-time vocational school -0.8761 -0.3305 0.1125 0.2148 -0.1235
Technical school -0.3956 -0.7630 0.3869 0.4931 0.1175
Polytechnic -0.4680 0.3859 0.7472 0.3855
College/ University -0.6130 -0.7308 0.3423 0.5828 0.3444
Occupational group
plant cultivation, breeding, shery 0.3612 0.2311 -0.2451 -0.1867 0.1409
mining, mineral extraction -0.0739 0.0533 | | -0.3048
manufacturing Ref. 0.3186 -0.3145 -0.0503 0.1684
technical professions -0.3619 0.1088 0.1024 -0.3804 -0.0994
service professions -0.1275 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
other professions 0.0612 0.2342 | -0.0952 0.2271
Professional rank
worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. -0.1675 -0.1642 -0.0038
worker, skilled worker -0.4108 -0.2570 -0.2505 -0.2384 -0.1289
white-collar worker, simple occupations -0.3360 -0.1932 0.1732 0.0845 0.0269
white-collar worker, advanced occupations -0.0722 -0.2577 0.3421 0.0787 -0.0031
other -0.1234 -0.0484 Ref. Ref. Ref.
Qualication (with work experience) 0.0840 -0.0348 0.2408 0.1146 0.1921
Career Variables
Duration of unemployment (weeks) 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0003
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0021 -0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0012
Number of placement propositions 0.0257 0.0188 0.0237 0.0198 0.0249
Last contact to job center -0.0090 -0.0153 0.0436 0.0134 0.0039
Rehabilitation attendant -0.0486 0.1397 0.0542 0.0386 -0.2161
Placement restraints -0.2163 0.0715 -0.4175 -0.0959 -0.0306
Programme before unemployment
no further education or job-preparative programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
further education compl. successfully, cont. education 0.0893 0.2039 0.1271 0.0338 0.0848
further education compl. successfully, voc. adjustment 0.3363 0.4125 -0.0594 | 0.3738
job-preparative measure 0.3617 0.2956 | | 0.0796
job creation scheme 0.9458 1.1101 0.9000 0.9192 1.0393
rehabilitation measure -0.0976 -0.0651 0.1854 -0.1974 0.1111










Variable Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe.
Regional Variables
Size of labour oce district (labour force)
to 150.000 Ref. -0.0479 0.0647 0.1925 -0.1409
150.000 to under 250.000 -0.0814 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
250.000 to under 350.000 -0.4063 0.1285 -0.2426 0.0382 0.0480
350.000 to under 450.000 -0.1612 -0.0264 0.0202 0.1708 0.0277
450.000 and over -0.3101 -0.2739 -0.0522 0.1845 -0.0010
Underemployment rate of labour oce district (4. quarter 1999)
< 10% Ref. -0.3122 Ref. Ref. Ref.
10%-12,5% 0.1432 -0.3673 -0.1285 -0.1713 -0.0587
12,5%-15% 0.0523 Ref. -0.2173 -0.3479 -0.1116
>15% 0.0019 -0.1849 0.1454 -0.2088 -0.2268
Bold letters indicate signicance at the 1% level, Italic letters refer to the 5% level.
1 DoR=Degree of restriction
Ref.=Reference category for probit estimation
| Category has been omitted from estimation









Variable Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe.
Constant -3.4513 -2.3926 -1.5896
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.0454 -0.0181 -0.0252
Age2 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0002
Married -0.0296 -0.2047 -0.2026
Number of children -0.0215 0.0389 -0.0352
German 0.1121 0.1159 0.0946
Health restrictions
no health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref.
accepted DoR1, 80% and over 0.7754 0.5711 0.4369
accepted DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.5151 0.0872 0.2998
accepted DoR, 30% to under 50% 1.0982 0.7195 0.8150
accepted DoR, 30% to under 50% no equalisation -0.0432 0.0301 -0.0229
remaining health restrictions -0.1788 0.0012 -0.0726
Qualication Variables
Professional training
without completed professional training, without CSE -0.5191 0.0635 0.0858
without completed professional training, with CSE 0.0245 0.1650 0.1080
industrial training Ref. Ref. Ref.
Full-time vocational school -0.1043 0.1197 -0.0871
Technical school -0.0175 0.4850 0.1860
Polytechnic 0.4115 0.8784 0.6011
College/ University 0.5070 0.4027 0.4930
Occupational group
plant cultivation, breeding, shery | -0.1635 0.2318
mining, mineral extraction | | |
manufacturing -0.5789 Ref. 0.1733
technical professions 0.1588 -0.6313 0.0816
service professions Ref. 0.2679 Ref.
other professions 0.3406 0.1832 0.2094










Variable Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe.
Professional rank
worker, not skilled worker -0.3465 0.0379 -0.0857
worker, skilled worker -0.2474 -0.0736 -0.2119
white-collar worker, simple occupations Ref. 0.0603 -0.1544
white-collar worker, advanced occupations -0.1232 0.3136 0.0288
other -0.1265 Ref. Ref.
Qualication (with work experience) 0.1698 0.1013 -0.0022
Career Variables
Duration of unemployment (weeks) -0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0003
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0014
Number of placement propositions 0.0296 0.0213 0.0250
Last contact to job center 0.0248 0.0329 -0.0163
Rehabilitation attendant -0.0487 0.0624 0.3013
Placement restraints -0.1253 -0.0848 -0.1797
Programme before unemployment
no further education or job-preparative programme Ref. Ref. Ref.
further education compl. successfully, cont. education 0.4274 0.2386 0.0607
further education compl. successfully, voc. adjustment 0.3168 0.0998 0.3932
job-preparative measure | 1.4814 0.5991
job creation scheme 1.4912 1.5696 1.2716
rehabilitation measure 1.0426 0.1966 0.1056
Regional Variables
Size of labour oce district (labour force)
to 150.000 -0.0896 0.0156 -0.2729
150.000 to under 250.000 Ref. Ref. -0.1738
250.000 to under 350.000 -0.2225 0.1778 -0.1265
350.000 to under 450.000 -0.2594 0.1901 -0.2658
450.000 and over -0.0775 0.0323 Ref.
Underemployment rate of labour oce district (4. quarter 1999)
< 10% Ref. Ref. Ref.
10%-12,5% -0.0885 0.1159 -0.2358
12,5%-15% -0.1400 -0.1519 -0.0604
>15% -0.3618 -0.0509 -0.3034
(a) Due to the small number of participants the sectors agriculture and construction & industry have been omitted.
Bold letters indicate signicance at the 1% level, Italic letters refer to the 5% level.
1 DoR=Degree of restriction
Ref.=Reference category for probit estimation
| Category has been omitted from estimation









Variable Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe.
Constant -3.6252 -3.6638 -5.0056 -3.2208 -2.7295
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.0481 0.0574 0.0824 0.0068 0.0157
Age2 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0001
Married 0.0677 0.0803 0.2413 0.2496 0.0392
Number of children -0.0039 -0.0170 -0.0402 -0.0487 0.0038
German 0.3558 0.3317 | 0.2459 0.2545
Health restrictions
no health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
accepted DoR1, 80% and over 0.3524 | 0.3396 0.4010 0.1020
accepted DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.0605 0.1603 0.4490 0.2706 0.2921
accepted DoR, 30% to under 50% 0.0249 0.3366 0.3164 0.4002 0.3459
accepted DoR, 30% to under 50% no equalisation 0.0961 -0.0341 0.2099 0.0484 -0.2111
remaining health restrictions -0.0535 -0.0043 -0.1452 -0.0294 -0.0346
Qualication Variables
Professional training
without completed professional training, without CSE 0.1844 0.0766 -0.2373 -0.1303 0.0732
without completed professional training, with CSE 0.1317 0.0513 0.0133 0.0487 0.1841
Industrial training Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Full-time vocational school -0.2414 | 0.1168 0.2836 0.0237
Technical school -0.0973 -0.3702 0.5314 0.2402 0.1883
Polytechnic -0.3764 -0.1381 0.2445 0.3508 0.0775
College/ University -0.2791 -0.7474 0.3577 0.2957 0.1271
Occupational group
plant cultivation, breeding, shery 0.1609 -0.1701 -0.2881 -0.3725 -0.0765
mining, mineral extraction -0.0371 | | | -0.3469
manufacturing Ref. Ref. -0.5333 -0.1176 Ref.
technical professions -0.2018 -0.2644 0.2360 -0.1024 -0.1456
service professions -0.1570 -0.3038 Ref. Ref. -0.0472
other professions -0.2553 -0.8850 | -0.3939 -0.3892
Professional rank
worker, not skilled worker Ref. -0.0006 -0.0468 Ref. 0.1009
worker, skilled worker -0.1485 -0.1313 -0.0351 0.0674 Ref.
white-collar worker, simple occupations -0.2129 0.0305 0.2165 0.2101 0.2129
white-collar worker, advanced occupations -0.1219 0.0697 -0.0061 0.2941 -0.2612
other -0.0016 Ref. Ref. 0.1325 0.1187
Qualication (with work experience) -0.0493 -0.0244 0.2347 0.1917 0.1580
Career Variables
Duration of unemployment (weeks) 1.52E-05 -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0004
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0012
Number of placement propositions 0.0237 0.0296 0.0364 0.0259 0.0308
Last contact to job center -0.0420 -0.0417 -0.0210 -0.0141 -0.0482
Rehabilitation attendant 0.0325 0.0810 0.0911 0.3556 0.1241
Placement restraints -0.1402 -0.1884 -0.0871 -0.0619 -0.1427
Programme before unemployment
no further education or job-preparative programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
further education compl. successfully, cont. education 0.2270 0.2069 0.4175 0.1849 0.1434
further education compl. successfully, voc. adjustment 0.3206 0.3279 0.1198 0.3940 0.3005
job-preparative measure | 0.6743 | 0.6923 0.1349
job creation scheme 0.7968 0.7235 0.6202 0.8904 0.8237
rehabilitation measure | 0.1073 0.4903 0.0732 0.3017










Variable Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe.
Regional Variables
Size of labour oce district (labour force)
to 150.000 -0.0938 Ref. Ref. -0.0705 -0.8443
150.000 to under 250.000 Ref. -0.3956 -0.2123 Ref. -0.5855
250.000 to under 350.000 -0.1225 -0.5321 -0.1230 -0.0893 -0.4153
350.000 to under 450.000 -0.3225 | -0.5979 -0.3445 Ref.
450.000 and over | | | | |
Underemployment rate of labour oce district (4. quarter 1999)
< 20% -0.5478 0.3090 -0.0310 0.2031
20%-22,5% -0.2194 -0.0387 0.2270 -0.1530 -0.2433
22,5%-25% -0.2535 -0.0535 Ref. 0.0131 -0.0481
25%-27,5% -0.2514 -0.0635 0.0589 -0.0052 -0.2971
27,5%-30% -0.0676 Ref. 0.1779 Ref. Ref.
> 30% Ref. -0.2826 0.0795 -0.3190 -0.0517
Bold letters indicate signicance at the 1% level, Italic letters refer to the 5% level.
1 DoR=Degree of restriction
Ref.=Reference category for probit estimation
| Category has been omitted from estimation









Variable Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe.
Constant -4.1795 -3.2795 -5.5024 -4.4953 -4.0081
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.0679 0.0296 0.1066 0.0758 0.0540
Age2 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0006
Married 0.0534 0.0282 0.1166 0.0696 -0.0231
Number of children 0.0050 0.0149 -0.0163 -0.0173 -0.0020
German 0.5349 0.0433 0.5262 0.5384 0.3211
Health restrictions
no health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
accepted DoR1, 80% and over 0.2830 0.3897 0.0667 0.5334 0.5591
accepted DoR, 50% to under 80% -0.1553 | 0.5632 0.2311 0.2289
accepted DoR, 30% to under 50% -0.0858 0.1180 0.3681 0.3958 0.3179
accepted DoR, 30% to under 50% no equalisation -0.1120 | -0.1083 0.1608 -0.2554
remaining health restrictions -0.1357 -0.0631 0.0153 -0.0536 -0.0046
Qualication Variables
Professional training
without completed professional training, without CSE 0.1310 0.1566 -0.9507 -0.4526 -0.1225
without completed professional training, with CSE 0.0443 -0.0781 -0.1132 -0.0012 0.0456
Industrial training Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Full-time vocational school 0.0963 -0.0030 0.1683 0.3450 0.1373
Technical school -0.2693 -0.2176 0.2911 0.3781 0.3035
Polytechnic 0.1360 | 0.5345 0.2683 0.1850
College/ University -0.1583 | 0.4612 0.1375 0.2337
Occupational group
plant cultivation, breeding, shery 0.5078 0.3728 -0.3318 -0.3692 0.0890
mining, mineral extraction | | | | |
manufacturing 0.2565 0.1826 -0.6076 -0.1589 0.1069










Variable Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe.
technical professions 0.1402 0.1712 0.1851 -0.1560 0.2544
service professions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
other professions -0.4788 -0.1391 -0.3788 -0.2937
Professional rank
worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. -0.2871 Ref. Ref.
worker, skilled worker -0.1744 -0.1306 Ref. 0.0811 0.0113
white-collar worker, simple occupations -0.3843 -0.1801 0.0799 0.1530 0.1451
white-collar worker, advanced occupations -0.1637 0.1199 0.1190 -0.0234
other -0.0410 -0.1515 -0.0228 0.0451 0.0646
Qualication (with work experience) 0.0117 -0.1296 -0.0308 0.0607 0.0825
Career Variables
Duration of unemployment (weeks) -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0012
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0010
Number of placement propositions 0.0318 0.0416 0.0452 0.0451 0.0433
Last contact to job center -0.0268 -0.0408 -0.0198 -0.0234 -0.0211
Rehabilitation attendant -0.1187 0.1562 0.0859 0.1660 0.0570
Placement restraints -0.1407 -0.0177 -0.2287 -0.0542 -0.1378
Programme before unemployment
no further education or job-preparative programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
further education compl. successfully, cont. education 0.1049 -0.0038 0.3727 0.2580 0.1801
further education compl. successfully, voc. adjustment 0.2719 0.2183 0.2752 0.2098 0.1957
job-preparative measure 0.3043 | | 0.4073 |
job creation scheme 0.5608 0.3726 0.7931 0.7380 0.7204
rehabilitation measure 0.2969 0.2886 0.1495 0.0510
Regional Variables
Size of labour oce district (labour force)
to 150.000 -0.0398 Ref. 0.2690 Ref. Ref.
150.000 to under 250.000 Ref. -0.6235 Ref. 0.0364 0.1357
250.000 to under 350.000 -0.0972 -0.1615 0.1981 -0.0097 0.3104
350.000 to under 450.000 -0.2541 -0.9115 -0.5440 -0.4799 0.5514
450.000 and over | | | | |
Underemployment rate of labour oce district (4. quarter 1999)
< 20% -0.4675 0.1198 -0.3689 0.2453 -0.0372
20%-22,5% -0.3045 0.3653 0.1476 0.0003 -0.0116
22,5%-25% -0.2429 0.0075 0.0258 0.1069 -0.0912
25%-27,5% -0.1725 0.4083 -0.0272 0.1206 -0.0720
27,5%-30% -0.1068 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
> 30% Ref. 0.3828 -0.0293 0.0884 -0.0656
Bold letters indicate signicance at the 1% level, Italic letters refer to the 5% level.
1 DoR=Degree of restriction
Ref.=Reference category for probit estimation
| Category has been omitted from estimation
31B Figures
Figure B.1: Success Probabilities for West Germany
(Lower and Upper Bounds, with 95% condence levels)
Men: Agriculture Men: Construction & Industry
Men: Oce & other Services Men: Community Services
Men: Other Women: Oce & other Services
Women: Community Services Women: Other
32Figure B.2: Success Probabilities for East Germany
(Lower and Upper Bounds, with 95% condence levels)
Men: Agriculture Men: Construction & Industry
Men: Oce & other Services Men: Community Services
Men: Other Women: Agriculture
Women: Construction & Industry Women: Oce & other Services
Women: Community Services Women: Other
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